Is a political solution possible to the crisis in Afghanistan? This is the key question that comes up when reports speak of peace talks between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the Taliban leadership.

Taliban leaders have attached some preconditions to their participation on any negotiation with the Karzai government, which in turn is ready for unconditional talks. However, the US is against the idea of unconditional talks.

Washington is continuing to press Karzai to demand far-reaching concessions from the Taliban in advance of any negotiation. Washington's conditions would make it impossible for Taliban leaders to agree if they are interpreted literally.

"Anyone who wants to reconcile and play a more constructive role in Afghanistan's future must accept the constitution, renounce violence and publicly break with extremist groups such as Al Qaeda," says the US State Department.

Karzai has announced that he intends to invite Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar, to a national "Loya Jirga" or "grand council" meeting aimed at achieving a peace agreement.

The Taliban have already indicated that their fight with the US is confined to the borders of Afghanistan and they do not have a "jihadist" agenda similar to Al Qaeda, but there are other major differences between them and Karzai. One of them is over the Afghan constitution. The Taliban are demanding that the constitution be rewritten to allow the ulema veto power over the choice of government and the country's legal system be based on Sharia. That would be a direct challenge to the liberal democratic institutions as provided for in the existing constitution.

These and several other issues will remain bones of contention if, as and when any reconciliation talks begin, inside or outside Afghanistan. However, it is a far way ahead.

The US, which believes that its strategy of escalating the war by pumping in tens of thousands of additional soldiers, is cool to the idea of negotiations with the Taliban. US President Barack Obama is seeking to eliminate as many as possible of the Taliban and weaken the movement by mid-2011 before considering negotiating with "moderate" Taliban and whoever survives an expected US-led onslaught against the insurgents.

Karzai does not have much faith that the US will be success and even it did manage to eliminate some Taliban leader, it would only make matters worse for his hope of national reconciliation.

A "Loya Jirga" stands any chance of success only if all stakeholders in Afghanistan, including the country's neighbours and other regional powers, are invited to playing a role in the process of national reconciliation. The prevailing geopolitical elements -- mainly the deep divisions among the various groups in Afghanistan and the vested interests of some of the country's neighbours -- do not allow much room for optimism that this might happen.